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Abstract. This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in 
understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature confines a discussion of the 
usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments 
result in outcomes that are inconsistent with a straightforward interpretation of 
economic theory, some notion of ‘fairness’ is invoked. This paper uses symmetry 
requirements to formalize the notion of focal points. By doing so, it explains the 
focality of equal split division and it re-interprets recent experimental evidence in 
bargaining games. Experimental economists should try to empirically disentangle the 
importance of focal points from other explanatory factors (such as fairness). One way 
to do so, would be to study modal (instead of average) responses more systematically. 
Future theoretical research should focus on the strategic implications of proposing a 
frame (focal point) to conceive of the bargaining problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In contrast to mainstream approaches in game theory, Schelling (1960) forcefully 
argued that individuals in everyday life situations frequently use information 
contained in the labels of strategies to decide which strategies to choose. Schelling 
showed how the use of mutually recognized or recognizable signs (labels) may help 
players to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. He introduced the term ‘focal point’ 
to account for this use of labels.  
 
Schelling used games of pure coordination mainly as a means to illustrate how focal 
points may be used. However, Schelling (1960) ultimately was more concerned with 
bargaining than with games of pure coordination.2 The fact that he regarded focal 
points also to be of importance in bargaining situations (“mixed-motive games”) 
stems from the fact that there is a coordination aspect present in each and every 
bargaining problem in the sense that “parties recognize that there is a wide range of 
outcomes preferable to both of them over no agreement at all” (Schelling, 1960, pp. 
101)). Within this set of mutually beneficial outcomes, there is conflict of interest. He 
continues by arguing “[T]he psychic moment of ‘mutual perception’ that can be 
verified as real and important in the tacit [bargaining] case has a role to play in the 
analysis of explicit bargaining. Coordination of expectations is the role.” (p. 101). 
Other passages stressing the similarities between tacit and explicit bargaining in terms 
of focal points can be found on pages 72-4 of Schelling (1960). 
 
Unfortunately, most of the later literature on focal points has restricted itself to 
coordination games. The more recent coordination literature on focal points can be 
divided into three strands. The experimental literature has basically confirmed the 
results of Schelling’s informal experiments and tested some of the more recent formal 
theories (see, e.g., Mehta et al. (1994) and Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997)). The 
evidence suggests that individuals are indeed able to successfully use differences in 
strategy labels to coordinate their actions. Earlier philosophical literature, on the other 
hand, emphasized the difficulties of making the notion of focal points consistent with 
                                                 
2 Of course, I do not want to argue that Schelling’s contributions to the bargaining literature are 
confined to the notion of focal points only. For a recent overview discussing the width of Schelling’s 
work, one may wish to consult http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2005/ecoadv05.pdf. 
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the rationality notion used in game theory without denying the empirical validity (see, 
e.g., Gautier (1975), Gilbert (1990)). Finally, more recent theoretical literature, 
initiated by Bacharach (1991, 1993) and Crawford and Haller (1990) and later by 
Casajus (2000), Sugden (1995) and Janssen (2001)), incorporates the notion of focal 
points into a more formal theory of games by redefining (but not eliminating) the 
rationality notion. The present paper shows how some of the ideas expressed in this 
more theoretical literature can be extended so that they are applicable to bargaining 
situations. 
 
The main line developed in this paper is that players use their knowledge of the 
bargaining game and the perceived common background to look for different 
possibilities to describe the game in ways that potentially may also be recognized by 
other player(s). If players cannot find a vocabulary that they think is mutually 
recognizable in which they can distinguish between some strategies, then these 
strategies are symmetric with respect to each other. Players must treat these 
‘undistinguishable’ strategies in a symmetric way. Moreover, and this may be 
important in bargaining situations, players may not be able to usefully distinguish 
between the positions they have in the game. For example, in symmetric games it may 
be unclear to the players whether they are Column choosers or Row choosers. In this 
case, players must consider symmetric strategy combinations only. The symmetry 
requirements thus imposed create constraints on the sets of strategies players may 
possibly choose. The constraints imposed by these frames help players to find 
mutually beneficial bargaining outcomes. 
 
The main point the paper wants to make is that focal points deserve serious attention 
in the bargaining literature. To my knowledge, there is only one other paper (Binmore 
et al. (1993)) explicitly dealing with the notion of focal points in bargaining. That 
paper is, however, experimental in nature and deals with the evolution of conventions 
in a specific set-up. Moreover, the present paper makes a first attempt to use focal 
points to explain the frequently observed equal-split division of the surplus. The paper 
re-interprets experimental evidence on ultimatum bargaining games and a recent 
experiment by Falk and Kosveld (2004) and argues that these results may well be 
(partly) driven by focal point considerations rather than by fairness considerations 
only. One way to disentangle focal points and fairness considerations, so this paper 
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argues, is by investigating differences between modal and average responses more 
carefully than is typically done in the experimental literature. 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. The next Section provides an 
example of a coordination game that enables us to informally describe the main 
concepts used in this paper. The notion of action symmetry and player symmetry are 
more formally introduced in Section 3. Section 4 then shows that in quite a few 
bargaining situations, a 50-50 split can be rationalized in terms of the concepts 
introduced. Section 5 continues in a slightly more speculative fashion by arguing that 
some of the recent behavioural literature on ultimatum bargaining games can be re-
interpreted in terms of focal point considerations. Section 6 concludes with some 
suggestions for further research. It is argued that experimental research must attempt 
to empirically disentangle focal points from other potentially important factors 
explaining results found in the laboratory. Theoretical research may focus on the way 
labels may be used strategically, an idea that is underdeveloped so far.  
 
2. A Simple Example of a Coordination Game 
 
To illustrate the main ideas consider the following example. Suppose individuals 1 
and 2 have independently of each other to choose one out of three blocks. The players 
do not observe the choice made by the other and cannot communicate. All observable 
characteristics of the blocks that are mutually recognized are identical apart from their 
colour, i.e., locations and/or other characteristics are scrambled to such an extent that 
players cannot use these to coordinate their actions. One block is blue, the other two 
are green. Inside each block, a number indicates the identity of the block. Each of the 
three blocks contains a different number and the number is unobservable for the 
players that have to make choices. Only after the choice is made, the block is opened 
to determine which block a player has chosen. If, and only if, the players choose the 
same block, identified by the number inside, the players are rewarded. That is, the 
interaction structure is one of pure coordination. Which block should a player choose? 
 
The natural solution seems to be that both players choose the blue block. The reason 
is as follows. The players know that the only way they receive a reward is by picking 
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the same block as the other player. They therefore have to look for a clue that can be 
recognized by both. The example is structured in such a way that the only difference 
between the blocks is their colour. Even though there are three blocks, it seems 
therefore that the players conceive of the game as one of choosing between blue and 
green. If a player chooses green, she has no reason to distinguish between the two 
green blocks. She therefore will treat the two green blocks in a symmetric way in any 
choice she will make. Given this symmetry, it remains uncertain what the pay-off of 
choosing green is. Even if both players choose green, there is a probability (equal to a 
half, if symmetry is respected) that they do not choose the same block. However, if 
both players choose blue, then the reward is maximal and certain. Intuitively, 
therefore, the players should choose blue. 
 
The two principles that are used in this paper to arrive at this solution are the Principle 
of Insufficient Reason (PIR) and, what I will call, the Principle of Individual Team 
Member Rationality (PITMR). PIR basically says that a rational choice cannot 
discriminate between two strategies if they have the same characteristics. At a more 
formal level, the principle is implemented by using the idea that an attribute induces a 
partitioning of the strategy set into equivalence classes and that a rational choice treats 
members of the same cell symmetrically. In this particular example, colour divides the 
strategy set into a cell with one blue block and a cell with two green blocks. A 
strategy that respects PIR gives equal probability to the two green blocks. The pay-off 
matrix as perceived by the players (one choosing rows, the other choosing columns) 
can thus be represented as in Table 1, where the reward is normalized to be equal to 1. 
 
 Choose Blue Choose Green 
Choose Blue 1, 1 0, 0 
Choose Green 0, 0 ½, ½ 
Table 1. The transformed ‘choosing a block’ game 
 
PITMR says that if in the class of strategy combinations that respect PIR there is a 
unique strategy combination that is Pareto-optimal, then individual players should 
play their part of that strategy combination. Such a unique Pareto-optimal strategy 
combination forms inevitably a Nash equilibrium of the transformed game. The 
notion of PITMR is identical to Luce and Raiffa’s (1957, pp. 107) “solution in the 
 6
strict sense”. The uniqueness requirement is added to avoid confusion among the 
players (see also the discussion in Schelling (1960, pp. 291ff). PITMR is similar to 
the criterion of pay-off dominance (as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and 
further analyzed by Colman and Bacharach (1997), among others), the principle of 
coordination (as proposed by Gauthier (1975)) and the criterion of collective 
rationality (as proposed by Sugden (1991)). The main difference with most of these 
notions is the uniqueness requirement. In the present case, the class of mixed strategy 
combinations that respect PIR can be parameterized by 
)},,(),,{( 222111 ggbggb pppppp , with 12 11 =+ gb pp  and 12 22 =+ gb pp , where 
bp1  ( bp2 ) represents the probability with which individual 1 (2) chooses the blue 
block and )( 21 gg pp  represents the probability with which individual 1 (2) chooses a 
green block. It is easy to see that the unique Pareto-optimal strategy combination that 
satisfies PIR is {(1,0,0), (1,0,0)}. Thus, the combination of the two principles explains 
the intuitive idea that players will choose the blue block. 
 
The example exploits the fact that if players cannot distinguish between certain 
strategies, these strategies should be treated symmetrically. Alternatively, it can be 
argued that players cannot distinguish between the different roles (Row or Column 
chooser) they may have in playing the game. Therefore, in addition to the symmetry 
implied by the attributes of the strategies, another type of symmetry implies that 
players really should play identical strategies. Symmetry with respect to the positions 
of players is not used in the example above, and if we would consider it, the argument 
would not change fundamentally. In the bargaining examples we consider below, 
symmetry across players’ positions is, however, crucial. 
 
The above example is special in that it only investigates the consequences of the 
strategies being different along one attribute (or dimension), namely colour. Other 
difficulties arise when strategies can be distinguished along two or more dimensions. 
In this case, players can conceptualize playing the game in different ways. Each of 
these conceptualizations induces a different view of how the game can be played. 
Depending on the conceptualization (frame), different strategies open up and different 
pay-offs can be realized. Bacharach (1993) and later Janssen (2001) have introduced 
the idea of Variable Universe Games to analyze the way players can choose which 
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frame to adopt in coordination games. Part of the strategic behaviour of players is 
which conceptualization to choose. In bargaining situations, players may further try to 
impose a certain frame on how to play the game. Equal split is usually a convincing 
focal point (and we will argue below why), but what to split equally depends very 
much on the perceived frame (conceptualization). This part of the decision problem is 
not analyzed in traditional game theory, because a particular conceptualization is 
imposed on the players when the game theorist specifies the strategy space of the 
game. 
 
The principles of PITMR and PIR are not uncontroversial. Goyal and Janssen (1996) 
discuss the similarities and differences between the different concepts. Bacharach 
(1991, 1993) also employs the notion of PIR. A discussion of the pros and cons of 
PIR and PITMR can be found in Janssen (2001), among others.  
 
3. Symmetry 
 
In this section, I give a more formal description of the types of bargaining situations 
we consider and the way I introduce, more formally the notion of action symmetry 
and position (or players’) symmetry. These definitions follow to a large extent the 
definitions given in Crawford and Haller (1990). Experimental evidence on the 
framework presented here is provided by Blume (2000) and Blume and Gneezy 
(2000). 
 
Two players, denoted by 1 and 2, play a bargaining game where the bargaining is how 
to divide the gains from trade. These gains are normalized to be equal to 100. Given a 
certain frame (F) of the game Player 1’s strategies are called the Row strategies and 
denoted by R(F); player 2 chooses column strategies denoted by C(F). Unlike Janssen 
(2001) I only consider situations where both players have the same frame. The reason 
framing is discussed at all is that in some bargaining situations I consider, one of the 
players has the possibility to offer a certain way the bargaining problem is to be 
framed. Depending on the frame proposed a different bargaining situation emerges. 
As the relevance of strategic framing decisions has not been discussed in the literature 
before, I consider for simplicity only bargaining problems where a framing decision 
can be imposed by one of the players so that in the ‘real’ bargaining game, both 
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players adopt the same frame. Hence, a pre-bargaining stage concerning the frame to 
be adopted is excluded from the analysis. In case examples are discussed in which 
framing is not relevant, the dependence of R and C on F is simply dropped. The pay-
offs for the two players when 1 chooses strategy )(FRr ∈  and 2 chooses strategy 
)(FCc∈  are denoted by ),( criπ , i=1,2. If r and c are such that an agreement is 
reached, then 100),(),( 21 =+ crcr ππ . The game structure is assumed to be common 
knowledge.  
 
There are two types of symmetry I would like to discuss. A first type of symmetry, 
description symmetry, depends on the frame that is adopted. Given a certain frame F, 
description symmetry says that a player should assign the same probability to all 
actions that are descriptively identical under that frame. Description symmetry is 
implied by PIR. It is the type of symmetry used in the example of Section 2 to argue 
that players in that example should choose a strategy that gives equal probability to 
the two green objects. 
 
Position symmetry, on the other hand, refers to the symmetric position players in a 
bargaining situation may have vis-à-vis each other. Of course, from one perspective 
one may argue that players in most bargaining situations are not symmetric to each 
other, for example, simply because one player wants to sell something, while the other 
wants to buy. However, if adopting the frame of bargaining over a pie (common 
surplus) is legitimate, then it is obvious that the two players are in a symmetric 
position vis-à-vis each other if there is no exogenously imposed rule creating an 
asymmetry between the players. This is true even if the size of the pie is uncertain as 
both players have incomplete information concerning the reservation price of the 
other player.  
 
I define position symmetry in the following way. Players’ positions are symmetric 
with respect to each other if interchanging them yields (possibly after permuting rows 
and columns) the same pay-off matrix (for more details, the reader is referred to 
Crawford and Haller, 1990, pp. 579). Position symmetry tells players to choose 
identical strategies if players’ positions are symmetric. 
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An attainable strategy combination is one that respects description and position 
symmetry whenever they apply. PITMR then says that if there is a unique Pareto-
optimal attainable strategy combination that is such that individually players do not 
have an incentive to deviate from it, then players choose their part of this strategy 
combination. The requirement “that individually players do not have an incentive to 
deviate from it” is added to avoid that the solution concept tells players to cooperate if 
they play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
 
Reading some parts of Schelling (1960), the reader may get the impression that the 
author is opposed to the imposition of mathematical symmetry requirements. For 
example, he argues that “The uncertainty that can usually be presumed to exist about 
each other’s value systems also reduces the usefulness of the concept of mathematical 
symmetry. Mathematical symmetry cannot be perceived if one has access to only half 
of the relevant magnitudes.” (p. 117-8). Our discussion gets around this problem by 
considering the case where either both players know each others’ reservation prices, 
or alternatively, and arguably more realistic, where both players only know their own 
reservation price and they are symmetrically (un)informed about the reservation price 
of the other player. 
 
 
4. The Focality of Equal Split 
 
In this section I consider a specific bargaining game, the so-called Nash demand 
game, and analyze it with the concepts defined in the previous section. Two players 
choose independently of each other a natural number between 0 and 100, representing 
the share (in percentage terms) of the surplus (cake) that will be divided between 
them. If the sum of the shares sums up to a number smaller than or equal to 100, then 
their claims are compatible and they both receive the share they mentioned. If the sum 
is larger than 100, the claims are incompatible and nobody receives anything. The 
game can be represented as in Table 2 below, where player 1 chooses rows and player 
2 chooses columns. 
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 0 1 2 3 …. 98 99 100 
0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 … 0,98 0,99 0.100 
1 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 … 1,99 1,99 0,0 
2 2,0 2,1 2,2 2,3 …  0,0 0,0 
3 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 … 0,0 0,0 0,0 
… … … … … … 0,0 0,0 0,0 
98 98,0 98,1 98,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
99 99,0 99,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
100 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Table 2. A discrete version of the Nash demand game where the first Column (Row) 
represents the share the first (second) player claims. 
 
This game has many Nash equilibria. Any combination (r,c) with r+c=100 forms a 
Nash equilibrium. There is, however, one solution that seems to stick out, namely 
(50,50) and it would seem that many real world players would go for this particular 
choice. Loosely speaking, the reason seems to be something like the following. Any 
strategy combination (j, 100-j), j=1,…,100 is as good as any other. Due to the 
strategic uncertainty implied by the fact that the two players choose independently of 
each other, the players do not have any reason to discriminate between j and 100-j. 
Even if they somehow think that together they will choose the strategy combination 
where one plays j  and the other chooses 100-j, they have no way to know who will 
play which strategy (j or 100-j). The problem implied by this form of strategic 
uncertainty is not present if, and only if, j=100-j, or j=50.  
 
Although there are other (mostly axiomatic) solution concepts, most notably the Nash 
bargaining solution, available in the literature that select the 50-50 split as the 
outcome of the game, there does not exist a formalization of the above more 
behavourial intuition. Using the notions expressed in the previous section, the 
intuition can be formalized as follows. Let us denote by pij the probability that player i 
chooses number j. It is clear that without any additional frame, all actions are different 
from one another and therefore that description symmetry does not invoke any 
restrictions upon the strategies players can choose. It is easy to see, however, that the 
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positions of the two players are symmetric: interchanging the Row and Column 
position does not change the players’ pay-offs. Position symmetry then implies that 
.21 jjj ppp ==  Given this restriction on the attainable mixed strategy combinations, 
the expected pay-off to each of the players equals kj
j
kj ppj ⋅∑∑ −== 10001000 . Given 
the non-negativity constraints 0>jp  and ∑ = =1000 1j jp , one can show that this 
expression reaches a (unique) maximum for p50=1 and pj=0 for 50≠j . Thus, the 
optimal attainable strategy combination is for both players to choose the strategy 50 
for sure. As both players choosing 50 is a Nash equilibrium, it is easy to see that no 
one individually has an incentive to deviate from choosing this strategy. PITMR can 
then be applied to argue that both players individually will choose to play 50. 
 
Another way to derive the focality of the 50-50 split is to say that players can think of 
the following ‘equality’ frame: they either choose an equal division, or they choose an 
unequal division. If they choose an unequal division, description symmetry under this 
frame tells players to give equal probability to any strategy that proposes an unequal 
division. Given this `equality’ frame, the pay-off matrix reduces to the one given in 
Table 3. (The pay-off of choosing unequal division are calculated as follows. If the 
other player chooses equal division, then the pay-off of choosing unequal division is 
∑ = .100/49 0 jj  If the other player chooses unequal division, then this pay-off equals 
( ) .10000/)1100()100( 1005149 0∑ ∑ +−+− == jjjj jj ) 
 
 Choose Equal Division Choose Unequal Division 
Choose Equal Division 50, 50 25, 12.375 
Choose Unequal Division 12.375, 25 16.7925, 16.7925 
Table 3. A framed version of the Nash demand game. 
 
It is easy to see from Table 3 that given this frame, choosing Equal Division is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium. 
 
The original bargaining game analyzed in this Section can be played in many different 
variations. For example, it can be argued that if both players’ claims are incompatible 
they have the possibility to renegotiate in a next period. As the symmetric game then 
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repeats itself one may argue that whatever the claims made at that stage, players will 
receive the same expected pay-off in the continuation game. Moreover, if players 
discount future pay-offs, there is a cost associated with not reaching an immediate 
agreement. Replacing the pay-off of (0,0) by (x,x) with x <½ implies that the expected 
pay-off formulae will change into 
kjk jjk
j
k jj ppxppj ∑∑∑∑ +−==−== ⋅+⋅ 100 1100100010001000 . It is easy to see that this 
change in pay-offs does not effect the remainder of the analysis: 50 remains the focal 
point. 
 
Alternatively, one may argue that if the sum of the shares that are claimed by the 
players is smaller than 100, they may still sit down at a later moment to divide the 
remaining surplus. Again, if these future pay-offs are discounted, the above symmetry 
principles claim that players will split the surplus equally and choose 50. 
 
 
5. Focal Points in Ultimatum Games 
The bargaining example analyzed in the previous section is, of course, just one highly 
simplified structure in which bargaining takes place. Real life bargaining problems 
contain many other elements that are not captured by this example. In the present 
section I will discuss some examples of bargaining games that contain elements of 
commitment and threat not present in the example analyzed in the previous section. In 
particular, I will discuss a series of experimental results on ultimatum games and the 
recent experiments by Falk and Kosveld (2004). 
The ultimatum bargaining game plays a central role in the bargaining literature and 
has attracted a lot of attention from theoretical and experimental economists alike. 
The game assigns the right to make an offer (a share of the surplus to be divided) to 
one of the players (the Proposer) and gives the second player (the Receiver) only the 
right to accept or reject this proposal. If the proposal is accepted, it is implemented; if 
it is rejected, none of the players gets anything. The ultimatum game has many Nash 
equilibria. Basically, any division of the surplus can be represented as the outcome of 
a Nash equilibrium (like in the game of the previous section). However, because of 
the sequential nature of the game the notion of subgame perfection can be invoked to 
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reach the conclusion that the Proposer should propose a very small fraction of the 
surplus to the receiver (or even nothing) and that the receiver should accept every 
proposal that is made. Of course, this solution implicitly assumes that (i) people are 
self-interested and that (ii) the structure of the pay-offs is common knowledge among 
the players. If one of these conditions fails, the Proposer may rationally propose more 
to the Receiver than a very small share. 
A wide range of papers (see, e.g., the initial paper by Güth et al. (1982) being the first 
and Hoffman et al. (1994), and more recently Camerer (2003, chapter 2) for an 
overview and discussion of different contributions) provides experimental evidence 
showing that Proposers actually propose much more than what the subgame perfect 
equilibrium suggests Proposers should propose and that Receivers frequently reject 
marginal proposals. In fact, the modal offer is almost always to divide the surplus 
equally.  
One way to explain this pattern is to introduce the idea that individuals have a 
preference for ‘fairness’.  The interpretation of fairness as inequity aversion (see, Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999) has come to dominate a large literature. Without denying the 
usefulness of explaining equal split outcomes in terms of fairness considerations, I 
would like to propose an alternative explanation based on focal points. The alternative 
explanation starts by recognizing that even in the ultimatum game there are multiple 
Nash equilibria and that players face a selection problem. Subgame perfection is one 
mechanism selecting among the many equilibria. Subgame perfection is based on the 
fact that the sequencing of actions breaks the symmetry between players and favors 
the player making the proposal. An explanation in terms of focal points assumes that 
despite the ‘objective asymmetry’ players perceive of the interaction in a symmetric 
way.3 Depending on the framing of the ultimatum game, players may readily translate 
the game into their own vocabulary in something like the following: “One of us is 
randomly assigned the role of Proposer. Independent of whether I or my game mate 
will be assigned this role, I should think of a number representing both the share I will 
propose to my game mate if I have the role of Proposer and the minimum share I will 
                                                 
3 Perceiving the ultimatum game as symmetric may seem farfetched. However, others (Pull, 2003, and 
Selten, 2000) have also offered this as a potential explanation for observed behaviour. Later in the 
paper I present experimental evidence suggests players may actually perceive the game in a symmetric 
way.  
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accept if I play the role of Receiver”. It is clear that if players perceive the ultimatum 
game in this way, then the subjective game the players are playing is a kind of 
coordination game described in Table 4 below, where each cell contains the expected 
pay-off of the players. Using position symmetry or description symmetry in the 
equality frame then reveals that choosing 50 is the focal point.  
 0 1 2 3 …. 98 99 100 
0 50,50  ½,49½ 1,49 1½,48½ … 49,1 49½, ½ 50,0 
1 49½,½ 50,50 1,49 1½,48½ … 49,1 49½, ½ 50,0 
2 49,1 49,1 50,50 1½,48½ … 49,1 49½, ½ 50,0 
3 48½,1½ 48½,1½ 48½,1½ 50,50 … 49,1 49½, ½ 50,0 
… … … … … … 49,1 49½, ½ 50,0 
98 1,49 1,49 1,49 1,49 1,49 50,50 49½, ½ 50,0 
99 ½,49½ ½,49½ ½,49½ ½,49½ ½,49½ ½,49½ 50,50 50,0 
100 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 50,50 
Table 4. Ultimatum Bargaining Under a Veal of Symmetry.  
Is there any experimental evidence that players may perceive of the ultimatum game 
in a symmetric way like the perception described above? I think the evidence 
presented in Hoffman et al. (1994) may be re-interpreted in this way. Hoffman et al. 
(1994) conduct many different versions of the ultimatum game experiment, two of 
which are important for our purposes. In one treatment, they have the Proposer being 
determined at random, whereas in another treatment the players first play a contest (a 
current events quiz) and the winner of the contest gets the right to play the role of 
Proposer. In the random assignment treatment (mimicking the perception described 
above) a little more than 50% of the Proposers chose to offer an equal split. 
Moreover, in that treatment some (albeit insignificant number of) unequal offers were 
rejected. In the contest treatment, only 10% of the proposals split the surplus equally 
and all offers were accepted. In both treatments, the ‘objective’ bargaining game is 
asymmetric: all bargaining power is in the hands of the Proposer. However, randomly 
determining the Proposer strengthens the symmetry perception of players, which 
makes them propose an equal split. Winning a Contest provides the Proposer (and the 
Receiver) with a reason to break the symmetry and the focal point of a 50-50 split. In 
the contest treatment, the focal point of equal split is (at least) partly replaced by an 
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equally pervasive frame (perspective) that “the winner deserves more”. As this 
perspective does not have a clear focal point, offers seem to be much more spread out. 
In a similar vein, Güth and Tietz (1986) presents an experiment in which the right to 
be the Proposer is auctioned. They also find that the original surplus is not split 
equally. Interestingly, however, they also find that the proposer does not keep 
everything to himself, but rather decides on a split of the surplus taking account of  
the amount of money paid in the auction. 
Another way to think of explaining equal split divisions in ultimatum games in terms 
of focal points is by introducing uncertainty concerning relevant pay-off functions. If 
the Proposer is uncertain about the pay-off function of the Receiver, i.e., the minimal 
share that is still acceptable to the Receiver, then the following observation taken 
from Schelling (1960, p. 111-2) seems relevant: 
In fact, a focal point for agreement often owes its focal character to the fact 
that small concessions would be impossible, that small encroachments 
would lead to more and larger ones. One draws a line at some conspicuous 
boundary or rests his case on some conspicuous principle that is supported 
mainly by the rhetorical question, “if not here, where?” 
There is not just a marginal difference between a 50-50 split and a 51-49 split. The 
first is an equal division, the second is not. Above I have formalized this idea using 
description symmetry in an ‘equality’ frame. The importance of this difference is 
corroborated in an experiment (Güth et al., 2001). In this paper, results of three 
experiments are reported in which equal split in one experiment is replaced by nearly 
equal split in the two other experiments. The “fair” offer is chosen much more often if 
an exact equal split can be chosen. 
The large experimental literature goes into some depth in trying to explain the 
observed deviations from standard economic theory for Proposers and Receivers 
separately. The common idea here is that it is probably most difficult to reconcile 
observed rejection rates (see, e.g., Falk et al. (2003)). Above I have, however, adopted 
a framework to formalize focal points that is based on the notion that players conceive 
of their situation in a symmetric way and that a focal point really is a rule players are 
looking for that helps them overcome a coordination problem or an equilibrium 
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selection problem. Focal points have then, by their very nature, not very much to say 
on the single agent decision problem, which the Receiver’s decision situation in a 
sense is.  
In order to empirically distinguish between fairness considerations and focal point 
considerations, one may try to exploit differences in behavior between Proposers and 
Receivers along the lines sketched above. Another way to discriminate between focal 
point considerations and fairness considerations is to exploit differences between 
modal responses and average responses in an experiment. It seems that fairness 
considerations can be more easily traded off against bargaining power considerations: 
proposing a 60-40 split can be easily rationalized by arguing that a Proposer cares 
quite a bit about fairness, but that he also wants to exploit his own bargaining power 
to some extent. And the same applies to a 61-39 split. As focal points very much 
center on rules that are easily recognized by players, however, such a trade-off is not 
easily conceivable for focal points. Players either follow a rule or not. If focal point 
considerations are important for many players, one should see therefore a modal 
response that is chosen by many players. 
Recently, Falk and Kosfeld (2004) have conducted a fascinating experiment in which 
a variation on the ultimatum bargaining game was played. Instead of being in the 
position to accept or reject an offer, the Receiver in their set-up was in the position to 
choose whether or not she wanted to impose a minimum on the amounts to be offered 
to her. Any offer that was eventually made was automatically accepted. There were 
also some other, less important, differences to the standard ultimatum game. First, the 
game was cast in terms of a principal-agent framework. Any amount x that the agent 
proposes not to keep for himself is doubled before it is given to the Principal 
(Receiver). The total amount that the agent disposes of equals 120 so that the final 
pay-offs are 120-x for the agent and 2x for the principal. Thus, if the agent proposes 
x=40, then both players receive a pay-off of 80. In different treatments, this minimum 
bound x  was specified ex ante to be equal to 5, 10 and 20, respectively. The main 
result they find is that if Principals impose a minimum bound, then agents choose 
much lower offers than in case they have an unrestricted choice set. Moreover, most 
Principals decide not to restrict the choice set. Falk and Kosfeld (2004) interpret their 
findings in terms of ‘trust’. If agents feel they are trusted (i.e., no lower bound is 
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imposed) they are ready to give more. Imposing a lower bound is a signal of distrust 
that is returned by a low offer. The title nicely reflects this interpretation: “The 
Hidden Cost of Control”. 
Not denying the plausibility of this interpretation and the discussion of different 
possible motivations they provide, I would like to offer another interpretation based 
on the notion of focal points. Looking at Figure 1 in Falk and Kosfeld (2004) it turns 
out that in case no minimum bound is imposed, the modal offer is 40. Depending on 
the treatment, this offer is made by 25-40% of the Proposers. Apparently, in the 
absence of minimum bounds agents make such a proposal that both players receive 
the same pay-off. From Schelling’s focal point perspective of “if not there, where?” 
this behavior is easily understood: symmetry or equality seems to be the only or 
certainly the most outstanding principle to us in deciding what to offer. 
In the case a minimum bound was imposed, this situation changes dramatically. With 
minimum bounds, 50% or more of the agents proposes to offer an amount exactly 
equal to the minimum bound. My interpretation of this result is that when introducing 
a minimum bound, the Principal offers in fact another frame to the agent to think 
about the problem what to offer: “I give him what he asked for”. By requiring a 
minimum offer, the Principal implicitly offers a new answer to the question “if not 
there, where?” Understanding the strategic effect of creating such a new focal point, 
the Principal realizes that it is not in his interest to propose such a frame to think of 
what to offer and that proposing such a frame is actually a bad strategic move. In the 
experiment, most Principals understand the logic so that in fact they do not create a 
new focal point. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The notion of Focal Point is rarely used in recent theoretical or experimental research 
on bargaining. The unimportance attached to focal points becomes apparent once it is 
realized that modal responses are not presented. Keeping the notion of focal points in 
mind, there is a sharp (and not a marginal) difference between proposing a 50-50 split 
or a 51-49 split of the surplus: A 50-50 split is an equal division, all other proposals 
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are unequal! Experimental research reports average proposals, median proposals, or 
that more than x% of the proposals gives more than y% to the Receiver. The fact that 
the modal proposal is often 50-50 does not receive attention. If focal points are taken 
seriously, it is modal (and not median or average) proposals that should be focussed 
on as explained in the previous section. 
 
This paper’s main message is that focal points are worth studying in the context of 
bargaining problems. Mutual expectations about reservation prices are crucial in 
bargaining. Coordination of these expectations brings about the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. Invoking the notion of subgame perfection is one way to select among 
equilibria; focussing on focal points is another. Without other points to coordinate 
expectations, focal points in bargaining games usually center around equal division of 
the surplus.  
 
An interesting issue for future research is how focal points can be used strategically 
by players in bargaining situations. One way to consider is that certain actions create 
new points of focality, such as in the experiments reported by Falk and Kosfeld. In 
their experimental game, the pay-offs are such that it is not a wise strategy to create 
such a focal point. In other games, it may actually be the other way around and that 
players do have incentives to create and impose new ways to think of the bargaining 
situation. One such a way is to create alternative frames of thinking about the surplus 
that is to be divided. Another line of research should focus on ways to experimentally 
disentangle focal point explanations for bargaining outcomes from other explanations. 
The difference between modal and average responses should play a key role here as 
many players should choose the modal response if focal points are important, whereas 
this is not the case for fairness-based explanations. 
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